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Few errors were identified in the original publication of the article. The corrections
are as follows:
1. The ‘Abstract’ section should read as below:
According to the fitting attitudes (FA) analysis of value, value entails fittingness. In
this paper, I shall argue that those committed to this implication face a serious
explanatory challenge. This argument is not intended as a knock-down argument
against FA but it will, I think, show that those who endorse the theory incur a
particular explanatory burden: to explain how counterfactual (dis)favouring of
actual (dis)value is possible. After making two important preliminary points (about
one of the primary motivations behind the theory and what this implies,
respectively), I briefly discuss an objection to FA made by Krister Bykvist a few
years ago. The point of discussing this objection is to enable me to more easily
present my own, and I believe stronger, version of that objection. The overall
argument takes the form of, simply, a counterexample which can be constructed on
the back of (an acceptance) of my two preliminary points. Throughout the paper, I
try to respond to various objections.
2. On page 6, in the second paragraph, ‘g’ and ‘g*’ should be replaced by ‘q’ and
‘q*’, respectively:
The original article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1172-x.
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Perhaps the FA theorist could respond as follows: In order to contemplate the
solitary good of the happy egrets (again calling this q) we don’t need to single out
any one particular (non-actual) world at which q obtains; we need only entertain the
proposition that there is some world at which q obtains. Now consider some actual
solitary good, q*. By hypothesis, no actual person can identify, and so no actual
person can contemplate, q*. But why can’t a non-actual person do so? If
contemplating g doesn’t require singling out some particular world at which
q obtains, why should contemplating q* (or e, or any other actual solitary good or
evil) require singling out some particular world?
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